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In February, 1986,

large sections of northern California

experienced a period of intense and protracted rain and snow
storms from a series of back to back wet Pacific storms.

As a

consequence, maj or flooding occured in a number of areas along
several river drainage systems.

The flooding and associated

damages resulted in large scale property damage to residences,
businesses

and

agricultural

enterprises,

viticultural areas of Sonoma and Napa counties.
the

flooding,

thousands

of

families

destroyed and daily life disrupted.

were

including

key

In the course of
evacuated,

homes

A number of California

counties received federal disaster declarations, making them
eligible for federal relief programs made available through
Disaster Assistance Centers

(DAC I s)

established throughout the

stricken areas by FEMA.
While national media attention to the unprecedented flooding
in northern California was quickly redirected to the destruction
of one of NASA's space shuttles,

the problems of responding to

the flood and its thousands of victims nevertheless persisted.
The paucity of national media coverage of the events in
California belies the scope and impact of the disaster in terms
of both financial and human costs.
low,

While the death toll was very

the property damage and resultant dislocation of families

was extensive if not adequately dramatic to draw media attention
away from the space shuttle debacle.
The destruction of homes and the displacement of families
made the stricken communities a suitable place to investigate the
role of social

support in mitigating the stressful effects of
1

residential

dislocation on disaster victims.

Cal ifornia disasters,

Prior to the

approval to study social support and the

mental health impacts of disasters had been received from the
Natural

Hazards

Research

and

Applications

Information

Center,

under the aegis of it's "Quick Response" research program.
report presents

findings

from research conducted with

This
NHRAIC

support.
To present an overview of the research that I conducted, this
report will be divided into three major sections.

First a

general description of the flooding and its social impacts in
northern California will be presented.

Because the nature of the

flooding differed considerably by locale, these differences will
be highlighted.

This particular study will focus on one impacted

community, and the nature of the disaster in that community will
be

described

after

an

overview of the statewide damage

is

presented.
The second segment of this report will describe the study
questions that guided the research and briefly discuss some of
the extant literature on the topic.

In this section the field

procedures that were followed as well as a description of the
qualitative methodologies will be given.
unique

Because of several

characteristics of the research setting,

data gathering

techniques required a certain amount of flexibility,

hence the

use of qualitative techniques.
The third segment of this report will examine the data,
looking specifically at social support and mental health impacts
of the disaster,

relocation stressors,

housing problems,

disaster social trends and post-disaster effects.
2

pre-

Included here

will be a discussions of some of the unique problems that seemed
to affect the victims

(and disaster workers)

in the flooded

community.
The Winter Floods, California 1986
Northern

California was battered by series of

intense

Pacific storms starting February 12, 1986 and persisting for more
than a week. While some 29 counties in California were declared
emergency areas by the state, the locales receiving the greatest
damage included Sonoma, Napa, Lake, and Yuba Counties, along with
large areas of the delta region where the Sacramento and San
Joaquin rivers empty into San Francisco Bay.
The chief source of

flooding

in Sonoma County was the

Russian River which heavily damaged the town of Guerneville, the
sUbject of this study.
River

To the east in Napa County, the Napa

flooded

causing the evacuation of 4200 residents of the

town of Napa.

Property damages estimates in Napa were placed at

forty million dollars with an additional sixteen million dollars
in damage to the vineyards.

Some 12,000 of 30,000 acres of wine

grapes were inundated although growers did not expect any long
term effects on production.
Another major source of property damage was the Yuba river
which broke through an 84 foot high levee and flooded the town of
Linda near Sacramento.

Ironically, the Yuba was over 5 feet

below flood stage when the break occured.

Some 26,000 residents

were forced to evacuate and the flooding resulted in 6,700 homes
being

inundated at an estimated property loss of $50 million.

Elsewhere,

1300 had to evacuate after a
3

levee break along the

Mokelumne River.
Because much of the delta region is up to 20 feet below sea
level,

the levee. system containing the rivers flowing into the

area is critical, with breaks resulting in large scale flooding.
Levee

breaks

along

the

Sacramento

and San Joaquin Rivers

resulted in over 10,000 acres of prime

farmland being flooded.

Because of the volume of rain received (some towns reporting 22
inches in one week), rivers such as the Sacramento carried record
flows, often more than the 1100 miles of levees in the area could
contain.

For example the normal winter flow of the Sacramento is

approximately 40,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) but during the
February floods it reached over 630,000 cfs. Elsewhere, flooding
along the Eel River resulted in the destruction of two hundred
redwoods up to 1000 years old,

a loss of an essentially

irreplaceable scenic resource.
In addition to riverine flooding and levee breaks,
flooding also caused evacuation of residents.

lake

Clear Lake rose 4

feet over its banks necessitating the evacuation of 450 families
living along its shores.

Due to constricted outflow from the

lake, once the rains ceased the lake could
two inches per day.

be lowered less than

Lake Sonoma, a recently constructed flood

control and recreational lake went from 120 thousand acre feet to
240 thousand acre feet as it impounded some of the record runoff.
The lake is credited wi~h preventing the Russian River from
cresting any higher than it did.

A considerable area of the

Russian's watershed lies below the dam,

hence the extensive

flooding that did occur.
Some of the worst flooding along the Russian River occured
4

where the river cuts a steep canyon through the rugged Coast
Range to the point where it empties into the Pacific at the town
of Jenner.

Perhaps hardest hit was the town of Guerneville,

located along the Russian at the junction of two converging side
canyons.

More than 1600 had to be evacuated from the Russian

River area (including but not limited to Guerneville) with some
1000 homes receiving flood damage.

In Guerneville,

about 150

housing units were declared uninhabitable as a result of flood
damage.
Riv~r

17

At the start of the storms (Feb 12, 1986) the Russian

was running at 8.5 feet.

feet

above

Guerneville,

flood

It crested at more than 49 feet,

stage.

The flooding was such that

at one point was isolated and victims had to be

evacuated to Santa Rosa by helicopter.

utility service in

Guerneville was disrupted for more than two weeks,
victims

the

inundated

water

homes.

necessary
Overall,

to

clean up

damages

in

their

Sonoma

denying

previously
County were

estimated at 25 million dollars and the county received a federal
disaster declaration.
Overall losses
million.

in California have been placed at $319

The state drafted a $115 million state emergency aid

plan for victims including a program of $5000 cash grants for
victims without insurance.

Those monies were in addition to

FEMA's aid programs, meaning victims could receive as much as $10
thousand in cash grants.

The Red Cross provided important

emergency aid as well as temporary housing support for victims of
the Guerneville flood,

as well as in other stricken areas.

Because of the nature of the damage in Guerneville and the
5

evacuation

experiences

research site.
communities

of victims,

it was

selected as

the

Guerneville and several adjoining small

including Monte

tourist/vacation trade.

Rio,

However,

number of poorer residents.

are

focused 'on

the area

summer

also is home to a

The Russian River

tributaries have flooded the town in the past,

and its

but to nowhere

near the extent of the 1986 deluge.
Because of Guerneville's geographic (and some would say
social and economic)

isolation from the rest of Sonoma County,

the management of the flooding and evacuation was somewhat
problematic.

The county's emergency services disaster center in

Santa Rosa was mobilized on Feb. 13 (Thursday) and the Red Cross
soon after.

The mobilization was in response to county wide

heavy rains which had pushed the Russian River up to 32 feet,
five short of flood stage.

A 37 foot crest was predicted for

Saturday the 15th. The Red Cross established an emergency shelter
in the Guerneville Veterans Memorial Building which housed 160
evacuees that Saturday when the river crested at 38.4 feet.
On Sunday the National Weather Service issued a statement
saying that the river at Hopland had peaked and was receding,
indicating that it would soon be dropping in downstream
Guerneville.

However because of heavy rains in the central

watershed, downstream of the Hopland gauging station, the river
did not act according to official expectations.
began further rising on that Sunday and on Monday
local state of emergency was declared.

The Russian
(Feb.

17)

a

The river hit 46 feet

late monday and surged toward its eventual near 49 foot crest on
Tuesday.

While many residents had already evacuated their homes
6

for the apparent safety of the emergency shelter in the Veteran's
Building,

their evacuation experiences were,

in fact,

just

beginning.
Late Monday,

as the river continued to rise,

officials

decided to evacuate the emergency shelter and take the refugees
to Santa Rosa 25 miles to the east of the stricken community.
However by the time that decision was made both roads to Santa
Rosa were closed from flooding, leaving no overland escape route.
Instead, the victims were first moved to a church on high ground
in Guerneville to await a helicopter evacuation to shelter
facilities

in Santa Rosa.

Through apparent problems in

coordination between various

organizations managing the

emergency, there were delays in the airlift.

Not all of the 1200

refugees were able to be evacuated that Tuesday and thus had to
remain

in

Guerneville

while

the

flooding

continued.

remaining victims were evacuated by noon the following day.

The
It

took a total of 152 helicopter "sorties" to evacuate all the
victims to emergency shelter in Santa Rosa.
Because of the scale of the flooding, the numbers affected,
and the failure of the river to "behave" consistently with
expectations, agencies were caught somewhat unprepared.

Because

far more were displaced than expected, food and manpower were in
short supply in the emergency shelter as the flooding started.
While the Red Cross had expected to use a Guerneville grocery
store as a food supplier for the shelter, the store was soon
flooded depriving them of a local supplier.

The Red Cross was

already responding to county wide flooding as well, resulting in
7

personnel and materiel
disaster.

shortages to manage the Guerneville

Because of Guerneville's relative isolation and the

number of agencies involved in the emergency,

communication

.
problems reportedly made coordination of response activities
In the course of data gathering,

difficult.

victims were not

short of criticism for how the evacuation was managed and when it
was begun.

Interviews with Red Cross workers disclosed that

throughout the evacuation process,
shel ters,

they

were

targets

as well as in the emergency

of

" •.. surprising

amounts

of

hostility by victims."
Victi~s

evacuated to Santa Rosa were able to find emergency

shelter at facilities set up by the Red Cross.

A total of more

than 700 evacuees occupied the Santa Rosa shelter on Feb.

18.

The shelter was kept open for two weeks to allow refugees to find
new housing or to return to their old homes in Guerneville •. At
the time of closing of the shelter (March 4) approximately sixty
victims were still housed there.

Remaining victims were placed

in motels by the Red Cross while they looked for housing.
However according to Red Cross officials,

approximately 30% of

those in the shelter at its closing may very well have been
homeless but not as a result of the flood.

One of the problems

that was repeatedly mentioned by officials in the course of my
research was the incidence of fraudulent disaster victims:
persons seeking aid and housing from disaster agencies who,

in

fact were not disaster victims.
As victims returned to Guerneville, they then began the task
of cleaning up (for those whose houses remained) and applying for
aid

from

Red

cross,

FEMA
8

and

as soc ia ted

agenc ies

and

organizations.

One of the chief problems facing the homeless

was finding affordable housing in a county with very expensive
housing.

Guerneville represented one of the few locations where

low cost housing was available in Sonoma County, but the Russian
River managed to erase much of that housing stock.
income victims with a
aff'ordable housing

That left low

significant problem in trying to locate

in the Guerneville area.

Problems victims

faced in emergency shelter, in obtaining aid, and in finding
housing will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.
Study Methods
Based on the nature of events at Guerneville, I selected that
town

to

disaster

study the
and

what

short-term mental heal th

impacts of the

role

have

affecting those impacts.
to

in

terms

experiences
numbe~

was:

of

and

social

played

in

Because of the problems already alluded

repeated
housing

support may

evacuations,

shortages,

of stressful events.

emergency

many victims

shelter

experienced a

The central question that I studied

What is the relationship between the use of social support

networks and the psychosocial or mental health status of victims
who had to live in emergency or temporary shelter as a result of
the disaster in Guerneville?

Basically this brief study involves

a qualitative examination of several issues:

the mental health

impact of disaster (short-term); relocation stressors and related
response generated demands; the use of informal helping networks
by victims to cope with disaster related stresses.
At the outset the reader is advised that this study is based
on a small scale "survey" of 15 victims who were interviewed
9

informally with a simple interview protocol.

It does not purport

to be either a clinical assessment of the mental status of
disaster victims,

nor does it claim to be a· systematic,

quantified sample of all victims using predetermined interview
schedules to provide quantified measures of selected scales.

In

that sense, this study is exploratory, based on several sources
of data.
The study of the mental health impacts of disaster is a
burgeoning area within the overall

field of disaster studies.

without delving into an overall review of that literature
Sowder,

1985 for a recent review),

(see

some of the literature that

pertains to this study will be noted.
There is disagreement in the literature as to the occurence,
pervasiveness and persistence of mental health disturbances as a
result of disaster
1979 and 1985).

(e.g.

Perry and Lindell,

1978; Quarantelli,

However there is ample evidence that under

certain conditions, psychosocial problems do occur (e.g. Hocking,
1970; Lifton, 1967; Lindy et al., 1981; Gleser et a1., 1981;
Sowder, 1985).
Quarantelli (1979) has argued that some of the stresses that
disaster victims face are not the result of the disaster per se
but rather the result of the societal responses to the event.
These "response generated demands" can include forced evacuation,
stays in emergency and temporary shelter, permanent relocation,
condemnation of properties, and disaster agency bureaucratic
"hassles."
In the case of living in emergency or temporary shelter,
as well as long-term relocation, victims often experience a
10

number of stresses associated with the loss of home and
neighborhood and the disruption of support networks
Steing1ass, 1985; Garrison, 1985).
find suitable or stable

(Sowder and

Additionally, the failure to

housing arrangements can inhibit various

aspects of victim recovery

(Bolin and Bolton,

Forthcoming).

Frequent residential changes while in temporary shelter has been
found to have negative psychosocial impacts (e.g. Gleser, et
a1.,1981; Lindy and Grace, 1985).
As Solomon (1985) has noted, disasters disrupt

ongoing kin

and friendship based social networks as well as create the need
for support from those networks.

Kin and friends can offer

victims

instrumental

emotional

cleanup/rebuilding,

support,

temporary shelter,

help

transportation,

and

in
the

like (Cobb, 1976; Kahn and Antonucci, 1980).
While coping with crises within the family is the normative
strategy in this culture, failure to deal effectively with a
crisis internally may result in families turning to support
networks for assistance. Such support networks may be either kin
based or non-kin support groups

(Solomon,1985).

The close,

intimate and personalized assistance available from primary group
members may be effective in mitigating the effects of stress on
persons in crisis situations such as natural disasters.
Paradoxically,
may disrupt
creating

a

disasters and the social responses to them

support networks while,
"need"

residentially

for

such support.

displaced,

temporary shelter, or

from

as

noted previously,

Whenever victims are

evacuation

to

emergency

or

through permanent relocation, their access
11

to support networks may be hampered.

In cases of evacuation, of

course, evacuees exhibit a preference for going to the homes of
friends or kin over that of official shelters (Drabek and Key,
1984).
in

a

Evacuation to the homes of friends and kin places victims
socially

particularly

supportive

in

societies

context
in

which

(e.g.

Loizos,

responsibility

1977),
to

kin

outweighs problems such as overcrowding and monetary demands
(Bolton, 1979).
In situations in which victims temporarily or permanently
relocate, their access to the stress bUffering effects of support
networks may be disrupted, hindering their psychosocial recovery
from the disaster

(Bolin,

1983; Parker,

1977).

Relocation can

deny victims access to the therapeutic effects of social support
in the post-disaster community (Milne, 1977; Wettenha11, 1979).
The disruptions of visitation patterns,

familiar surroundings,

and a secure home that accompany relocation increase the stress
levels that victims experience (Ahearn and Castellon,
Dudasik, 1980).

The

victims has

been

1979;

likelihood of mental

health problems among

found

qS a

to

increase

result of such

"relocation stressors ll (Parker, 1977:589).
Field Procedures:

In order to study the relationship

between the use of social support and the emotional status of
victims, I utilized two sources of information- victim interviews
and interviews with officials from a number of agencies and
organizations that had knowledge of the mental health impacts of
the disaster on victims in the Guerneville area.

After

preliminary phone contacts with FEMA in California and the
California

Office

of

Emergency Services
12

to gather general

background

information,

I

began

field work in March 1986,

approximately one month after the flooding ended in Guerneville.
In order to determine the most effective way to identify and
contact a

small

interviewing,

I

organizations.
Santa Rosa,

number

first

of victims

in Guerneville for

interviewed representatives

from several

These included Red Cross District operations in
People

for

Economic Opportunity

in Santa Rosa

(involved in helping the poor and homeless in Sonoma County), Red
Cross Service Center caseworkers in Guerneville,
health

workers

from

the

Guerneville

and mental

outreach

program.

Information obtained in these interviews helped in finalizing the
general interview protocol to be followed in the interviewing of
victims.
setting

It also alerted me to particular idiosyncracies of the
as

well

interviewing.

as

problems

I

might

anticipate

in

the

Included in the latter was a warning that I could

encounter high levels of xenophobia in some members of the
community and the suggestion that I not attempt interviews with
outlying victims without being accompanied by a community member.
Apparently in
Guerneville,

the more

remote mountainous regions around

some residents are engaged in the farming of an

illegal cash crop that is of no small interest to the DEA and
other law enformcement agencies, hence the warning.

The counter-

cultural element coupled with a considerable amount of anger and
frustration with disaster agency representatives also made a
stranger asking questions suspect in the eyes of some victims.
In the course of my interviews with agency and program
personnel I was fortunate enough to make contact with a long-time
13

resident of Guerneville who offered his assistance in identifying
and interviewing victims in the area.

In addition, because he

was present during all phases of the flooding from onset through
the serial evacuations of townspeople to their piecemeal return
he

functioned

something

as

of

a

anthropological sense of the word).
doing the interviewing,

local

informant

Because I

(in

the

alone would be

and would be limited in the number of

victims I could interview, he helped me identify 15 actual flood
victim, based on his personal knowledge of the victims.

Because

he functioned as a Red Cross volunteer in the emergency centers,
he had first-hand knowledge of many of the victims.
problems in the Guerneville area,

One of the

as detailed to me by several

Red Cross personnel was that some of the victims making claims
for

flood

aid were not,

interviewing victims,
verified through

in fact,

flood victims.

:Before

their "authenticity" as flood victims was

pre-flood addresses that were in the impact

zone.
Data Gathering:

Because of the small scale nature of this

study and some of the special characteristics of the study site
already alluded to, all interviews were conducted using a general
protocol of topics to be discussed.

Interviews with agency

personnel were focused on the activities of the organizations in
the emergency and special problems they encountered in managing
the Guerneville operation.

Case workers

for Sonoma County

outreach and for the local Red Cross in Guerneville were asked
detailed questions about the victims in terms of their housing
options, their psycho-social status, and their long-term options
for being able to resettle in Guerneville.
14

Information from

these interviews was recorded and compiled for presentation in
this report.
For interviews with victims a two page protocol of general
questions was prepared to guide interviews.

Victims were first

queried about their pre-flood housing and occupation.
were then asked about their flood experience,
evacuation,
well

as

Questions
including

time spent in emergency and temporary shelter,

their use

emergency period

as

of informal support networks during the

for

shelter,

transportation and

related aid.

victims were asked to assess their post flood experiences and
prospects

in terms of reestablishing housing as well as

particular problems they might be having in

getting aid and

housing.
Lastly victims

were

asked

a

general

set of

questions

regarding their emotional status as a result of the disaster and
the role of support from kin and friends in affecting their
emotional status.

Because of the small sample,

the use of

quantifiable

mental health

rej ected as

formal

inappropriate.
questions
experienced

inventories was

Rather included in the protocol were general

based

on symptoms

(depression,

compulsive behavior,

and

feelings

anxieties,

al.,1980; Derogatis, 1975).

of

feelings

they may have

helplessness,

fears etc. (e.g.

hostility,

Dohrenwend et

It must be emphasized that although

the questions were br9adly based on psychological scales,

the

informal nature of the interviewing did not provide quantifiable
measures.

Instead the interviews provided indications of general

psychological distresses, not clearly defined DSM III diagnostic
15

categories of mental disorders.

All responses to questions were

recorded and later compiled and sorted into general themes and
categories of

This sorting and summarization of

responses~

answers constitutes the data analysis for this paper.
Qualitatitive techniques such as these are well suited to
exploratory research.

Such techniques also allow flexibility in

dealing with disaster victims who,

for one reason or another,

might be sensitive to a more formal interview style.

In the case

of

interviews

Guerneville

victims

the

informality

of

the

allowed completion of interviews with some victims who quite
clearly would have rejected a formal interview.

Interviews

ranged in length from 30 minutes to one hour depending on the
nature of the victim's post-disaster experiences and the types of
problems they might have experienced.

Interviews were completed

over a four day period in the Guerneville area,

except for one

interview done in Santa Rosa with a victim who hadn't yet been
able to find housing in Guerneville.
Analysis
victims that were interviewed can be divided into two broad
socio-economic categories.

One group consisted of lower-middle

to upper-middle conventionally employed persons.

conventional

here refers to small property owners (resorts, restaurants etc.)
or wage workers

at various enterprises or organizations

(mechanic, firefighter etc.)

in Guerneville.

Incomes among this

group ranged from $18,000 to more than $40,000 yearly.
characteristic of this

category of victims

(n=9)

was

A chief
relative

residential stablility in the area, and the existence of friend
and kin networks in the Santa Rosa area (as well as Guerneville).
16

The second category of victims that were interviewed can be
characterized as poor,
elaborate

friendship

community.

residentially mobile and lacking in

or

kin

networks

outside the

impacted

Three of the victims interviewed were female heads of

households on AFDC with incomes below the poverty line.

Three

others were self-employed artisans with marginal incomes.
victims

in

trailers,

this

second

category

lived

in

rental

All

units

or

in contrast to the first group which tended to own

their homes.

It is in this latter group where the highest levels

of depression,

anxiety and feelings

of helplessness about the

future, were mentioned during my interviews.
From interviews with the victims,
identify

several

experienced.

distinct

sources

it became possible to
of

stress

that

they

The intial flooding of homes and property began the

sequence of stressors for all victims.

Evacuation to emergency

shel ter and the serial evacuation of

two evacuation centers,

cUlminating in the aerial evacuation of refugees to Santa Rosa
was a second source of stress.
housing,

the

stay

in

the

For victims without alternative

emergency

also constituted a protracted stressor.
the clean-up of damaged homes,

shelter

in

Santa Rosa

The return to Guerneville,

the search for new housing,

and

the seeking of recovery aid were all tasks facing victims at the
time that interviewing took place.
Of course,
same extent.

not all these stressors impacted victims to the

Among the "conventional" victims, for example, none

stayed in the emergency shelter in Santa Rosa, but rather found
shel ter in the homes of kin or in motels.
17

Poorer victims did

not

appear

to have

networks

to draw on

in Santa Rosa

for

emergency or temporary shelter, and thus stayed in the emergency
shelter,

an

experience

not without

its

own

challenges

and

demands.
For the victims living in rental housing,
factors conspired to produce heightened

a· combination of

stress levels resulting

in more self-reports of depression, sleeplessness, and anxiety of
As already noted, this category of victims did not

the future.

have a support network to draw on outside the damaged community.
Similarly,

the

friends

(none

had kin)

they

reported

in

Guerneville tended to have few resources with which to help out.
Indeed,

many of their friends had also been "wiped out" by the

flood.

This

respondents,

is

who,

in contrast with the other category of
for the most part received temporary shelter

from kin or friends,

and who were also able to recruit friends

from non-impacted areas to help out in the drudgery of clean up
from

the

flood.

Not surprisingly,

the reported levels of

depression and anxiety in this group appeared consistently lower
than in the lower SES group.
One caveat is in order however in drawing conclusions about
the mental health impacts of the disaster and its aftermath on
the victims in this study.

That is, there is no way to determine

to what extent any of the

indication~

were present prior to the disaster.

of depression or anxiety

Most reviews of the mental

health literature indicate a higher incidence of mental health
problems among those in the lower reaches of the class hierarchy
in the U.S.
However it is also clear that the lack of support networks
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for the poorer victims who were interviewed meant that they
experienced stresses that other victims did not,

while at the

same time having fewer monetary or social resources to draw on to
help them cope.

Post-disaster housing is emblematic of some of

the difficulties this group of victims faced.
Guerneville, according to interviews with agency personnel,
is literally the only site of "low income" housing in Sonoma
County,

and there was little of that available even before the

flood.

This fact accounts for the presence of a considerable

number of AFDC families, low income artisans and the like in
Guerneville, as it was the only source of low income housing in
the county.

However the disaster destroyed many of the rental

housing units that the poor lived in, exacerbating a shortage of
low rent housing.

Thus for many of the poor in Guerneville,'

their prospects for finding post-flood housing were very limited.
This is in addition to the fact that federal programs to help
disaster victims recover are much more generous for homeowners
than for renters.

In essence renters were left to fend for

themselves after their 60 days (double the normal time) of rental
assistance ran out.
Because of the difficulty in finding replacement housing for
the poorer victims,

many returned to live in flood damaged

housing rather than have their landlords repair the building.
addition,
raised,

as some rental properties were repaired,
to

the

point

where

landlords of price gouging.

several

victims

In

rents were

accused

their

In one instance, a landlord was

insisting that his tenants bUy new refrigerators for their
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apartments, to replace those destroyed in the flood.

Since most

could barely afford the rent, his insistence on the purchase of
refrigerators meant that many could no longer live there.

The

problems that poorer victims faced with housing resulted in
apparent grief-like reactions over a lost home and fears of not
being able to find suitable (and affordable) housing.
One of the victims interviewed alluded to a " ••• real feeling
of desperation about this
just stuck •.. sometimes I

[her destroyed trailer].

I

guess lIm

just sit here and start crying. II

This

attitude was not uncommon among the poorer victims interviewed.
Most indicated that the feeling of being homeless and not having
any good prospects for reestablishing one, was stressful and
inescapable.
victims who had owned their own homes prior to the flood
appeared to have access to more resources as well as to support
networks to aid in clean-up and rebuilding.

Al though many in

this group reported frustrations and fatigue with the process of
clean-up, aid applications and so forth, most also indicated some
optimism about getting resettled.

Because this group as a whole

utilized kin and friends as sources of emergency shelter as well
as in helping them in moving back into their former homes, none
expressed any of the sense of helplessness and depression that
some of the poorer victims did. They were likely to mention, in
the course of the interviews, how grateful they were for the help
their friends and kin provided in the aftermath.

While this

social support cannot be considered the only mitigating factor in
the apparent lower levels of psychosocial distress among the
higher SES group, virtually all mentioned it during interviews.
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Because of some of the expressions of depression, grief and
anxiety that were being mentioned by some of the poorer victims,
I interviewed the case workers both at the Red Cross service
center and at the outreach program at Guerneville to get a
broader perspective on some of the types of psychosocial problems
they had encountered during the emergency and in the time period
since.
In addition to an increased overall caseload since the
flood,

I was told at the outreach Center that they were treating

an increase in depression cases.
for a period of a few days

Caseworkers there reported that

after the flood there was a period of

"elation" but after a week people "started wearing down and
breaking down." For those with homes, the return to Guerneville
meant

a

breakdown

psychological stress,
was

in

social

support and an

increase in

according to one social worker.

Also it

reported that there were some poorer victims whose "basic

living needs weren't being met."

The reference here was to

homeless victims who had neither the resources nor the access to
resources from support networks to get resettled into permanent
housing.
While social workers at the outreach program agreed that it
was poor victims,

those "at the margins of society," that were

having the greatest difficulty in coping, a common source of
grief and bereavement among several victims in counseling there
was the loss of pets.

In my interviews, 4 victims also expressed

guilt over the loss of pets and indicated that it was that loss
that was the hardest to accept.
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To summarize the main points thus far,
who

indicated

the

highest

level

(paticularly depressive states)

of

victims interviewed

psychosocial

distress

tended to be poorer, have fewer

friends whom to draw on for support, had problems in finding
affordable housing to return to,

and as a

consequence had the

longest stays in the emergency shelter in Santa Rosa.

While

higher SES victims were more likely to have friends and kin in
Santa Rosa

(4 of the 9

responden~s

held for the poorer victims.

worked there), the opposite

Among the latter, virtually none

reported friends outside the immediate Guerneville area.
for most of the higher SES victims,

Thus

the evacuation from

Guerneville meant continued access to social support networks, if
desired.

For the poorer respondents, the evacuation meant being

removed from available support except for whatever friends also
staying in the emergency shelter.
Based on information provided by Red Cross workers, outreach
workers, as well as interviews with victims, staying in shelters
was a source of considerable strain for many including those

.

responsible for managing the shelters.

Based on these sources,

it would be safe to characterize the shelters as having
unprecedented levels of violence,

interpersonal aggression and

hostility compared to most reports of shelter behavior in the
literature.
One respondent told me during an interview, "I was stuck in
three different shelters.

I was hungry, I got wet and cold and

spent alot of time not knowing what was going on.

Some people

around me were drunk or stoned and frankly I was pretty damned
scared of them.

At times I thought the flood was the least of my
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problems."
These problems were confirmed in discussions with Red Cross
workers.

One shelter worker described some of the victims as

" ... street people, a real sad group.
alcohol,

They were using drugs,

selling drugs ••. there was an attempted rape and family

disputes."

To try to alleviate such problems, armed guards were

posted at. facilities to try to control some of the aggressive
behavior.

Guerneville outreach also placed social workers in the

shelters to help victims talk out their hostilities and to keep
violent behavior in check.

Red Cross workers implied that it was

the so-called "street people" who were the source of much of the
anti-social behavior in the shelters.

One respondent indicated

that when shelter workers gave priority to the elderly for food
and

water,

they

received

verbal

abuse

from

other

shelter

occupants.
Whatever the source of the troubles in the shelters,

those

who spent any time in the shelters found the experience
stressful.
hostility,

Because shelter workers were the targets of much
I

pursued this sUbject in interviews with Red Cross

workers who managed the shelters and the disbursement of aid.
The central problems from shelter worker points of view
centered on the "unconventional" nature of some of the victims
and the problem of fraudulent claims for disaster aid.
many of the victims

lived

in campers,

Because

buses and the like,

verification of addresses was difficult for shelter workers.
Similarly, a number of those utilizing Red Cross aid and shelter
apparently had no clear "family structure" in the conventional
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sense.

This made it difficult to identify heads of households or

the number of persons in a household who actually qualified for
aid.

This, in turn, created problems in the disbursement of aid.

The lack of verifiable addresses also made determining whether an
aid applicant was actually a flood victim problematic.

This

resulted in very lengthy interviews with victims as they applied
for aid.

These delays resulted in heightened levels of hostility

toward agency personnel by victims.
in

an

interv iew,

As one shelter worker said

"These people would

come

different story each time trying to get aid.
trained to deal with this.

a

Alot of us weren't

It's real hard to approach victims
.'

while doubting there eligibility.
shelter was moved to Santa Rosa.

And it got even worse when the
There we got more homeless

coming in trying to be flood victims.
facilities."

in here with

They just overloaded the

The upshot was that fraudulent claims and the

demand for immediate relief by some victims placed many shelter
workers in a very demanding and stressful situation.

The problem

of worker burnout was frequently mentioned by those agency
personnel that were interviewed.
One

experienced

Guerneville
normal."

disaster

operation presented

worker

indicated

that

the

" .•• far more problems than

One specifically mentioned problem was the fact that as

the Santa Rosa shelter operation wound down, the Red Cross was
left with a small group of "hard core homeless."

This refered to

a small group of apparent victims who had no housing and were not
trying to find any.

One official indicated that when the shelter

would be closed, most in this group would " ... just drift off."
Verifiable victims who rented were entitled to sixty days rent
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while they looked for new housing.
rents

(typically in motels)

arrived.

The Red Cross was covering

until victim's

federal

aid checks

Such delays, as well as protracted stays in motels were

additional

factors mentioned by victims as continuing problems

that they were facing.
The

flooding

in Guerneville

seemed to exacerbate pre-

existing problems in the community.

As already noted, the lack

of low income housing became even greater after the flood.

The

marginal economic existence of a segment of the community became
more marginal.

Virtually all of the poorer victims that I

interviewed indicated that they did not feel that they had many
good prospects for finding suitable new housing.

As one told me,

"The folks I know around here are in the same fix I am.

Some of

them have been evicted and [their landlord] has kept their damage
deposits. It's not like I can ask them for help."
For those respondents who were homeowners, their post-flood
experiences and prospects appeared markedly different from the
poorer victims.
the future,
anxious,

As a group they expressed fewer worries about

and made fewer statements about being depressed,

or angry about the aid situation.

expressed

fewer

sleeplessness.

somatic

complaints

such

similarly, they
as

fatigue

and

Because the homeowners tended not to reside in

emergency shelters in the few weeks after the flood and had
liveable

options

in terms

of temporary housing,

it is not

surprising that they had fewer stress related complaints than did
the victims who were renters.
For the low income victims, on the other hand, the lack of
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support networks in conjunction with longer stays in the public
shel ter and

few

housing

Guerneville

in

opportunities

for reestablishing permanent

appear

negative mental health complaints.

associated

with

several

This latter group of victims

were more likely to answer positively to questions about if they
were:

nervous

or

jumpy,

anxious,

worried,

or had trouble

They also frequently referred to themselves

relaxing.

response to questions)

as being depressed,

(in

in low spirits,

or

"felt like crying." In terms of positive affect for others, they
were more likely to refer to themselves as feeling lonely or all
alone.

In terms of quantitative measures of psychological

distress then,
of

such answers would be categorized as expressions

(respec:tively)

anxiety,

(e.g.Veit and Ware,

1983).

quantify meaningfully,
interviewing,

depression

and weak emotional ties

While my sample is too small to

it was apparent in the course of

that the higher SES, homeowning victims were not

troubled by such distressed states nearly as frequently or as
deeply

as

interview,

the poorer victims.
" ... well,

As

one victim noted in an

you know for about a week afterward I was

really tied up and nervous, but once I got back here and got busy
with clean-up things don't seem too bad.

I

think things will

work out pretty well ... "
Given the existential
victims,

probl~ms

facing the poorer Guerneville

it should not be surprising that they appeared to' have

higher levels of psychological distress than other victims.

From

the small sample of victims I interviewed, it can't be determined
if the lack of social support played a significant role in that
distress.

The

lack of social support was one factor that
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conspired with several others

(e. g.

longer stays

in emergency

shelters, housing problems, few personal resources) to add to the
stressfulness of their post-disaster situation.

From the other

group of victims it can be concluded that having family or
friends

in surrounding communities became an important way to

avoid a protracted stay in the emergency shelter, with whatever
psychological benefits that may have entailed.

Too, having

surplus income or other financial resources allowed higher SES
victims to evacuate to motels, without needing to wait for cash
grants from the Red Cross or FEMA.
Conclusions
The flooding in Guerneville impacted what, in many ways is a
unique population,. and as a result, a number of problems emerged
both for victims and for the agencies responding
have been documented here.

As such,

~o

the flood, as

the Guerneville flood

confronted agencies used to responding in relatively routinized
ways

to victim needs,

extraordinary problems.
emergency shelters,
with several adults
claims

for

aid

by

with many

"non-routine victims"

and

Such problems as: violence and drugs in

non-familial collective living arrangements
in the household claiming aid,
non-victims,

difficulties

in

fraudulent
verifying

addresses because victims lived in buses or tents, hostility by
some

victims

experiences,

toward

aid

givers,

protracted

evacuation

extensive exposure to the flood for some victims,

intensification of low income housing shortages due to flood
damage,

were present and affected agency personnel, victims or

both.
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Identifiable psychological distresses, including depression,
anxiety, post-flood sleep disturbances were found to be more
common among lower income victims, victims who, for the most part
lacked extensive
community.
income

social

support networks

outside

the stricken

Such victims tended to lack steady employment or

(several were on AFDC)

and had difficulties in dealing

with the various aid bureaucracies because of unconventional
living arrangements and the lack of easily verifiable addresses.
One Red Cross worker referred to such victims as

"ghettoized,

people stuck in a different kind of poverty •.. drugs etc."

While

this "category" of victim only constituted a small portion of the
Guerneville victims, in the eyes of various agency personnel
responding to the emergency, they created major demands for the
aid giving agencies.
From interviews with both middle and lower SES victims,

it

was the lower SES victims who were most likely to express various
indicators of psychological distress,

as noted above.

class victims tended to have the material,
psychological

Middle

social support,

and

resources to better cope with the many stresses

associated with

some

Guerneville flood.

of

the unique characteristics

of the

Because middle income victims tended to be

homeowners they had access to more extensive aid programs from
the federal government

(e.g.

SBA loans,

longer periods of rent

subsidy while homes were being rebuilt or cleaned up etc.),
reducing some of the demands and stresses being placed on them as
recovery proceeded.

One important way that the middle income

victims tended to differ from the lower income victims in my
28

sample was the fact that the former averaged less than three days
stay in emergency shelters, while at least one of the poorer
victims

I

interviewed was still homeless and in the emergency

shelter more than three weeks after the flood.

victims with the

most extensive stays in emergency shelter (10 days or more)
appeared to express more feelings of depression than others.

In

this regard then, being able to draw on informal social support
networks was instrumental for a number of victims in being able
to find emergency shelter in a more private, and typically, more
supportive setting,

thus avoiding some of the problems that

occured in the emergency shelters.
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